This study reviews the liquidity costs for firms in outlying regions in primary listing on a centralized stock exchange. Using a unique hand-collected sample comprising all listed firms from across West Africa we find evidence that firms from outlying regions do have higher illiquidity costs although these can be mitigated from improvements in transparency that are associated with increasing familiarity amongst investment community of central exchange.
Introduction
The worldwide wave of mergers of national stock exchanges that has resulted in formation of agglomerated entities such as Euronext in Europe and Scandinavia has been largely motivated by notions of cost reduction through exploitation of economies of scale and scope in the provision of trading and related support activities that leads to enhanced competitiveness of these integrated markets in attracting ever increasingly footloose global investment capital.
Similar arguments regarding increased scale and scope efficiencies in exchange operations leading to competitive attraction of otherwise scarce global investment capital have underscored the formation of integrated regional capital markets in the developing world.
One example is the 1998 extension of the existing capital market in Cote d'Ivoire to all other member states of the Francophone UMEAO 1 region in West Africa through the establishment of regional BRVM 2 . However more recently the Anglophone markets of Ghana and Nigeria have developed an increasingly regional orientation through the attraction of primary listings of firms in neighbouring countries. Consequently we ask whether stock exchanges adopting a strong regional focus can provide effective liquidity to firms listing from more distant outlying regions or nations within an integrated framework.
The nascent literature on implications of regional capital markets in acting as a source of sustainable finance and liquidity to firms from more distant regions in a centralised marketplace is centred in three distinct strands. The first is rooted in economic geography literature where Klagge and Martin (2005) introduce notions of a lack of spatial-neutrality which is particularly prevalent in centralised capital markets leading to a funding gap and rationing of both credit and equity to firms located in more distant provinces. The second 3 focusses on the study by Loughran and Schulz (2005) contrasting liquidity of urban as opposed to rural based firms within largely centralised capital market of United States. The findings attribute the significantly higher liquidity of urban stocks over their rural counterparts through greater familiarity of urban stocks to institutional investors that are predominantly urban-based as well as their enhanced information access to urban-based firms.
The third and final strand of literature relates to informational access differentials between local as opposed to foreign analysts. Bae et al (2008) find evidence from study of local and foreign analysts across 32 countries that the former produce more accurate earnings forecasts and that locally-based analysts are especially important in institutionally deficient environments where there is less disclosure and greater earnings smoothing. Consequently Sun et al (2010) and Liu et al (2011) for discussions on south-south FDI emanating from India and China respectively) while the external funding and regulatory capital requirements of their subsidiaries is reliant on primary and joint-primary listings across West Africa's nascent stock markets. As such our study provides a unique insight into the informational asymmetries present across integrated regional markets such as BRVM as well as regionally focussed markets such as Ghana and Nigeria that underscore liquidity-based transactions costs incurred by large well known firms 4 from distant outlying regions on centralized exchanges. This is particularly pertinent in the case of Togolese Ecobank with unique joint-primary listing between BRVM, Ghana and Nigeria where all have common composition of senior management and boards of directors as well as the Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin subsidiaries of Bank of Africa.
The literature regarding liquidity within Africa's capital markets primarily focusses on the attribution of pricing premiums to liquidity in size and liquidity factor augmented variations of the capital asset pricing model. Hearn and Piesse (2009) and Nigeria alongside a further nine SSA equity markets and found that Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinska (1999) , henceforth LOT, proportion of daily zero returns indicator and to a lesser extent the multidimensional liquidity measure introduced by Liu (2006) are closely associated with total trading costs. The Hearn and Piesse (2013) study also introduced a unique series of controls to account for the impact on liquidity and transactions costs arising from the involvement of state, foreign partners, retained entrepreneurial founders, domestic and foreign venture capitalists within focal firm's organizational structure and ownership and finally whether firm is part of an extended family network or business group. Consequently the second contribution to the literature from our study is in the study of the contrasting impact of 5 regional listings on liquidity within a unique regional equity market setting of BRVM as well as Ghana and Nigeria in West African developing region.
Our maintained hypothesis is that liquidity-based transactions costs are higher for firms in outlying regions listing on a centralised stock exchange. However we also find evidence of a contrasting impact on liquidity related to the degree of economic and financial integration of the region and the location of the central stock exchange. We also find that firm's association with an extended family network or business group infers higher liquidity while involvement of state, foreign partner and foreign venture capitalists generally infer lower liquidity.
We proceed as follows: the next section reviews theoretical antecedents behind principal low-frequency liquidity measures and outlines their construction. It also outlines the literature behind regional markets as well as the firm governance and market controls alongside a newly introduced control accounting for impact of civil war on liquidity and transactions costs. Section 3 outlines data, sample construction and details the West African business and institutional environment while section 4 details empirical methods. Section 5 discusses results and the final section concludes.
The regional and governance Determinants of Liquidity

Dependent variables: Liquidity benchmarks
There has been considerable evolution in liquidity measures during the last decade although one measure, the bid-ask spread (Jain, 2002) , is generally used in literature as a low-frequency liquidity benchmark. However a serious limitation arises when closing prices deviate from the official bid and ask price quotes given that trades take place at different prices or even outside the quotes (Lesmond, 2005) . This is a particularly important issue in markets in West
Africa, such as in Ghana where pre-agreed details are often registered in trading sessions following transactions undertaken outside of the formal exchange (Akotey, 2009 Liu indicator, and LOT (1999) proportion of zero returns.
The bid ask spread
The bid-ask spread is the average of the available monthly quotes with a minimum of a single month's quote for that month and the average used for the spread, which minimizes outliers that result from monthly sampling. Finally, following Lesmond (2005) negative bid-ask spreads and those that exceed 80% are removed. The monthly quoted spread is defined as:
This follows Liu (2006) and is defined as LMx which is the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior x months (x = 1, 6, 12), that is:
where x_month_turnover is the turnover over the prior x months, calculated as the sum of the daily turnover over the prior x months, daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day, NoTD is the total number of trading days in the market over the prior x months, and Deflator is chosen such that, 
West African regional market variables
The literature relating to the differential impact between local as opposed to foreign (or more distant regional) firms and their respective analyst coverage alludes to elevated ownership in firms by mutual fund managers and investors that are local to them (Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Frieder and Subrahanyam (2005) ). In line with 8 this evidence regarding home bias in ownership, Loughran and Schultz (2004) The second explanation relates to familiarity. Using US sample sets Barber and Odean (2003) and Huberman (2001) all find consistent evidence of local biases in stock ownership and trading activity caused by enhanced exposure and familiarity with awareness.
However Grullon et al (2004) extend these findings with evidence that local familiarity biases can be overcome through increased advertising and brand awareness campaigns by more distantly located companies. Frieder and Subrahanyam (2005) find evidence that individual investors disproportionately hold firms with greater brand visibility. This is particularly pertinent in West African context given the negligible institutional investor participation within the regions markets with indigenous investment communities being primarily composed of local finance houses and individual investors from either wealthy social elites or overseas diaspora (see for discussion of Malian investment community).
To date, only three markets in Africa have successfully adopted integrated trading platforms: Egypt between Cairo and Alexandria (Hearn, 2011) , South Africa and Namibia (Hearn and Piesse (2012a, b) (Hearn, 2012a,b) . Overall this evidence indicates that the regional attraction of listings is growing in importance for the Anglophone West African stock exchanges of Ghana and Nigeria while it is underscored by considerable political impetus as well as advanced level of monetary and economic integration in Francophone UMEAO region in case of BRVM. However given the significance of evidence relating to local biases in ownership and trading activity as well as locally induced informational asymmetries we hypothesize that liquidity-based transactions costs should be positively related with more geographically distant regions. Thus we would expect firms from more distant regions and nations to be positively associated with increased asymmetric information and illiquidity.
Control variables
Firm governance controls
Following the recent study of Hearn and Piesse (2013) we use a series of dummy (1/0) controls to account for distinctive types of ownership and governance arrangements. These are the involvement of state or related government agencies, a long-term foreign partner, the maintained presence of an entrepreneur-founder on the board, the involvement of domestic or foreign venture capital and finally whether firm is affiliated to the extended network of family or business group. The employment of dummy controls mitigates concerns over potential endogeneity relationship between level of actual ownership by various entities and liquidity or spreads. Equally their employment is necessitated by often erratic availability of annual reports (see African Financials (2012)) as well as considerable variation in the quality of reporting ownership across national regulatory regimes (Hearn, 2013) .
In particular motivation for the use of state and long-term foreign partner governance dummy controls arises from phased privatization which is especially common across West
African region where it is notable that a particular peculiarity associated with nation states that are members of both Francophone UMEAO and CEMAC 4 economic and monetary unions is the dirigiste (state-led) capitalist model of development (Lavelle (2001); Hearn (2013) ). This when combined with civil code legal, political and governance systems that promote central authority of state and executive are also more commonly associated with full divestment of state ownership to a strategic foreign partner , 2013 which is more prevalent in privatizations in civil code as opposed to common law markets. This difference between civil and common law markets, largely underscored by the dirigiste economic model, has also been attributed to the general lack of entrepreneurial firms in listings in the stock markets in civil code law markets (Bennell, 1997) . Hearn and Piesse (2013) also find little involvement of entrepreneur-founders in listed firms across SSA region although their presence does impart a significant impact on liquidity. Hearn and Piesse (2013) also find considerable evidence of the pervasive presence of extended informal business groups and family networks. Figure 1 exemplifies the complexity of tracing extended family and business networks with the example of the Bank of Africa business group which is ultimately owned by Moroccan BMCE bank, itself owned by Benjelloun family.
Figure 1
Institutional Controls: Impact of civil war in Cote d'Ivoire
Schneider and Troeger (2006) highlight that while there is a considerable literature on the economic causes and consequences of armed conflicts and war, relatively little is known about the actual costs of war and conflict. Few, if any studies have focussed on the impact of domestic conflict, or civil war, on domestic capital markets.
Market Controls
The principal controls in liquidity based models are centred on notion of liquidity being reflective of the price for immediacy in trading demanded by active traders to passive market maker entities that face order processing and inventory risks. As such Stoll (2000) outlines market controls of stock price, return volatility or variance, traded volume and market capitalization. Price controls for discreteness and acts as an additional proxy for risk as low stocks tend to be riskier while increases in volume, number of trades and firm size (market capitalization) all increase the probability of locating a counterparty and thus are associated with reducing inventory risk. Additionally the stocks return variance measures the risk of adverse price changes on stocks placed in inventory.
Data
Data and sample selection
In order to estimate our liquidity benchmark, the bid-ask spread plus brokerage commissions we procure the end of day bid and ask quotes for Nigeria from Bloomberg while those for BRVM and Ghana are obtained direct from national stock exchanges. It is notable in the case of BRVM that bid and ask prices are only disseminated in daily trading reports and through no other means. As such these must be systematically collected, compiled and formed into a database prior to any further work. Equally the bid and ask prices are effective (not quoted) 
West African business and governance environment
A significant feature of the West African region is a general paucity in institutional quality inhibiting external contracting. This is exemplified in Appendix Table 1 Partly as a response to these deficiencies exchanges have resorted to the attraction of listings of corporate and government debt instruments, such as bonds and treasuries, in order to retain economic viability. This is exemplified by Cape Verdean exchange, with details outlined in Table 1 , where firms are attracted to list debt through competitive tax breaks of up to 50% reduction in corporate taxation rates which has led to the capitalization of listed corporate debt being almost six times that of equity. However the evidence from Table 1 also reveals characteristics in the operation of the Cape Verdean exchange common to the wider West
African region such as concentration of trading activity in small handfuls of stocks and very long order matching times that are occasionally as high as 24 days. This severity in absence of liquidity further underscores our choice of low frequency liquidity measures.
Table 1
The evidence from (Geocapital, 2013) . This Chinese-backed venture aims to consolidate the provision of financial services across Portuguese-speaking countries world-wide thereby acting to facilitate trade with China (Geocapital, 2013) . Figure 2 . However there are notable differences between these two rival conglomerates underscoring their expansion. In particular Ecobank has a more formalised structure based on that typical to a MNE while its rival Bank of Africa is structured more on an extended family or business network. Control across otherwise disparate entities across Africa is exerted through an elaborate system of cross-shareholdings between entities (see Figure 1 ) and directors have shared local directorships across separate individual group entities. Regionally distinct entities from both banking groups benefit from direct private equity involvement of PROPARCO (controlled by Agence Française de Développement), Netherlands development bank, FMO, and Belgian development finance entity, BIO. Access to private equity finance alongside the benefits arising from optimal coordinative power over resources attributed to membership of extended business group have enabled both banking groups to engage in rapid recent expansions across the African continent as is evidence from Figure 2 . 
Empirical Methods
In order to examine the relationship between our three designated liquidity measures, namely the bid-ask spread, multidimensional Liu (2006) 
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics
The evidence from Table 3 reveals characteristics of West Africa's equity markets and their regional focus as well as providing motivation for sample selection for inclusion in empirical modelling. There are some notable observations from descriptive statistics in Table 3 . The first is the relative inactivity and extremely high levels of illiquidity across all West African equity markets. This is exemplified in proportions of daily zero returns in excess of 90% for both the BRVM and the Ghanaian market while this ratio of inactivity ascends to over 93%
for the smaller markets of Cameroon, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone. Generally bid-ask spreads are reflective of this level of inactivity in being in excess of 14% in Ghana to over 6%
in BRVM where bid and ask prices are representative in the light that trading system is a call auction. However the very low bid-ask spreads in Nigeria alongside very high proportion of daily zero returns measure (over 80% across Nigerian market) infers that significant caution should be taken in interpreting bid-ask spread metrics in this market. More generally and the very small sample size and lack of time series underscores the omission from further study of Cameroon and Sierra Leone. Similarly the lack of bid-ask spread data from Cape Verde underscores the omission from further study of determinants of this particular liquidity measure. Consequently our final study is focussed on markets of Nigeria, BRVM, Ghana and then Cape Verde, though we only consider Liu and LOT zero returns measures in this latter market. Finally there is significant evidence of considerable variation in liquidity across primary listed firms from outlying regions -both in BRVM as well as in Ghana and Nigeria.
The evidence from Table 3 suggests that almost all trading activity in Ecobank within the Ghanaian market is concentrated on the locally registered affiliate, Ecobank (Ghana), with minimal activity in the parent holding entity, ETI. In contrast the ETI parent holding entity has considerable trading activity in Nigeria with traded volume in ETI being almost one and a half times that of the market average. This is likely reflective both of increased awareness of Ecobank brand alongside the impact of Ecobank's recent acquisition of local Nigerian banking entity, Oceanic Bank thereby further increasing its market share and brand impact in Nigeria. Finally there are marked differences between regional primary listed entities from across UMEAO nations on BRVM.
Table 3
Liquidity determinants in BRVM
The evidence from regression results in Table 4 Bank of Africa group which is a highly visible brand across UMEAO countries and therefore subject to high investor awareness and therefore decreased illiquidity.
In terms of the controls and the coefficient of association between civil war dummy and bid-ask spread is negative (-0.012) and statistically significant at 99% confidence level while it is positive and statistically significantly associated with LOT zero (+1.547) and Liu Finally all other firm governance controls have the expected size and direction of coefficients of association and are in line with literature (Hearn and Piesse, 2013) . As such the involvement of state, foreign partners and foreign venture capitalists are all positively associated with illiquidity while firms that are part of extended business group networks are negatively associated with illiquidity. In line with Stoll (2000) as well as Lesmond (2005) and Hearn and Piesse (2013) stock price, volatility, traded volume and size (market capitalization) are all negatively associated with illiquidity. 
Liquidity determinants in Ghana, Nigeria and Cape Verde
The evidence regarding the attraction of primary listed firms from other West African nations to Ghanaian and Nigerian exchanges is provided in Table 5 . While there are some differences in direction of coefficient of association between Togo (sole primary listed entity of ETI or Ecobank) and all three illiquidity measures generally the association is negative. This generally negative association is likely explained in terms of brand awareness (familiarity of local investors with brand) and relative financial integration with Ecobank having sizeable presence in Ghana through its local affiliate, Ecobank (Ghana) , and in Nigeria through its acquisition and re-branding of Nigeria's Oceanic bank. It is notable that the questionable accuracy of bid-ask data from Nigeria is further reflected in extremely low explanatory power of empirical model with bid-ask spread as dependent variable (an adjusted R 2 of a meagre 9%).
More generally across the firm governance controls and foreign partner, retained presence of entrepreneurial founder, involvement within extended family network or business group and participation of foreign venture capitalist are all associated with lower illiquidity in both Ghana and Nigeria. In contrast state participation is associated with lower illiquidity in Ghana and the opposite effect in Nigeria while there is some discrepancy in this latter market over the impact on either LOT zero or Liu illiquidity measures by domestic venture capitalists.
In particular domestic venture capitalists are associated with higher illiquidity using LOT zero measure and the opposite effect when using Liu indicator. It is notable that in direct contract to the evidence of association between foreign venture capitalist participation in firms and illiquidity in both Nigeria and Ghana, the association in Cape Verde is large, positive and statistically significant. This would infer that the presence of Geocapital private equity entity is associated with increased informational asymmetry and thus illiquidity.
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Finally all Stoll defined market controls have relationships with illiquidity measures as anticipated in literature (Lesmond (2005) and Hearn and Piesse (2013) ). As such stock price, volatility, traded volume and size (market capitalization) are all negatively associated with illiquidity. The only exception is in Cape Verde where size has a positive association with LOT zero (0.173) and Liu (0.520) measures. This would infer that larger firms are more opaque and have greater informational asymmetry in Cape Verde which is harder to explain and may be a nuance of a very small and extremely inactive market. Table 5 6. Conclusions
This study uses three low-frequency liquidity estimators, namely the bid-ask spread, LOT (1999) proportion of daily zero returns and multidimensional Liu (2006) indicator, to assess the impact on liquidity-based transactions costs arising from the attraction of primary listings on centralized stock exchange from more distant regions and nations.
We find substantial support that the attraction of foreign or more distant regional primary listings is associated with increased illiquidity of firms from these more distant outlying regions. However this increase in illiquidity is mitigated to a certain extent by increased brand awareness of those firms with primary listing on central market. We also find substantial support that the impact of civil war on asymmetric information is considerable and reflected in elevated illiquidity. These findings have the potential to better inform policy debates on the creation of integrated or regional stock exchanges in developing regions such as Africa where a significant shortcoming is the considerable differential in liquidity-based transactions costs arising from listings from more distant regions. Table 4 Results of regressions of total costs on liquidity proxies and measures for BRVM regional market
Regressions are on a firm-monthly basis. Three liquidity measurement variables are presented. Liu (2006) , turnover is a ratio of the traded volume of shares in relation to total number of shares outstanding and is scaled by the number of trading days in the month of measurement. It provides a measure of trading frequency. The final measure is the Bid Ask spread which is the average daily relative bid ask spread over the prior 1 month, where daily relative spread is the local currency denominated spread divided by average of Bid and Ask prices. Firm size is determined from the first day of each month. Volatility is the average daily stock return variance and price and volume measure the average price (local currency units) and trading volume over an annual trading period. Turnover, price, volume, and market capitalisation are all log scaled in line with Stoll (2000) . [-3 .89] † -0.010 [-3.30 [-0 .32] -9.071 [-10 .61] † -6.535 [-14.96 [-2 .43] † -0.008 [-1.55 [-9 .06] † -0.017 [-9 .77] † -0.482 [-2.24 ]** -0.339 [-1 .42]* -1.610 [-11 .30] † -1.578 [-11 .81] † Volatility -0.012 [-0 .59] -0.014 [-0 [-26 .10] † -2.605 [-26 .08] † -2.602 [-13 .81] † -2.565 [-13 .32] † Size -0.004 [-2 .26] ** -0.003 [-1 .53]* -1.640 [-12 .00] † -1.796 [-11.93 Regressions are on a firm-monthly basis. Three liquidity measurement variables are presented. Liu (2006) , turnover is a ratio of the traded volume of shares in relation to total number of shares outstanding and is scaled by the number of trading days in the month of measurement. It provides a measure of trading frequency. The final measure is the Bid Ask spread which is the average daily relative bid ask spread over the prior 1 month, where daily relative spread is the local currency denominated spread divided by average of Bid and Ask prices. Firm size is determined from the first day of each month. Volatility is the average daily stock return variance and price and volume measure the average price (local currency units) and trading volume over an annual trading period. Turnover, price, volume, and market capitalisation are all log scaled in line with Stoll (2000) . N is the sample size in firm months. The White cross-section t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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